Laboratory for Communications and Applications LCA

Security of Physical and MAC Layers

The following papers address how game theory can be used to analyze security issues at the physical and MAC layers. They mainly focus on wireless networks, where the attacker degrades the performance of the wireless nodes by jamming. Some papers also discuss eavesdropping attacks in wireless networks and use game theory to model the cost of these attacks and to design the countermeasures.

• L. Renou, T. Tomala, “Secure communication: A mechanism design approach,” in GameNets 2009.
• Zhu Han; N. Marina, M. Debbah, A. Hjorungnes, “Physical layer security game: How to date a girl with her boyfriend on the same table,” in GameNets 2009.
• J. Grossklags, B. Johnson, “Uncertainty in the weakest-link security game,” in GameNets 2009.
• E. Altman, K. Avrachenkov, A. Garnaev, “Jamming in wireless networks: The case of several jammers,” GameNets 2009.
• W. Saad, Z. Han, T. Başar, M. Debbah and A. Hjørungnes, “Physical Layer Security: Coalitional Games for Distributed Cooperation,” in WiOpt, June 2009.
  
• W. Trappe, A. Garnaev, “An eavesdropping game with SINR as an object function,” SecureComm 2009.
• Y.E. Sagduyu, R. Berry, A. Ephremides, “MAC games for distributed wireless network security with incomplete information of selfish and malicious user types,” GameNets 2009.

 

Mobile Networks security

The following papers deal with possible attacks and countermeasures in upcoming wireless networks. Given the ephemeral nature of communications in these networks, game theory can help identifying the optimal strategies of the mobile agents.

• I. Bilogrevic, M. H. Manshaei, M. Raya, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Optimal Revocations in Ephemeral Networks: A Game-Theoretic Framework,” in WiOpt 2010.
• S. Reidt, M. Srivatsa, and S. Balfe, “The Fable of the Bees: Incentivizing Robust Revocation Decision Making in Ad Hoc Networks,” In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2009.
• M. Raya, M. H. Manshaei, M. Felegyhazi, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Revocation Games in Ephemeral Networks,” In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2008.
• S. Buchegger and T. Alpcan, “Security games for vehicular networks,” in Proc. of Allerton Conf. on Communication, Control, and Computing, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA, September 2008.
  
• H. Otrok, M. Mehrandish, C. Assi, P. Bhattacharya, M. Debbabi. “Mobile Security: Game Theory,” In the Encyclopedia of Wireless and Mobile Communications Book, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.

 

Anonymity and Privacy

Game theory can help analyzing the economic aspects of privacy in wireless networks as it is shown in the following research work.

• M. Raya, R. Shokri, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux, “On the Tradeoff between Trust and Privacy in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks,” In ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security (WiSec), March 2010.
  
• J. Freudiger, M. H. Manshaei, J.-P. Hubaux, and D. C. Parkes, “On Non-cooperative Location Privacy: A Game-theoretic Analysis,” In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2009.
• A. Acquisti, R. Dingledine, and P. Syverson, “On the economics of anonymity,” In Financial Cryptography - FC '03, Springer Verlag, LNCS, 2003.

 

Intrusion Detection Systems

Intrusion detection (ID) is the process of monitoring the events that occur in a network and of analyzing them for the signs of possible violations of computer security policies. To study the underlying principles of ID system developments and their best strategies, the following papers define security games between the attackers and intrusion detection systems.

• Q. Zhu, C. Fung, R. Boutaba, T. Basar, “A game-theoretical approach to incentive design in collaborative intrusion detection networks,” GameNets 2009.
• L. Chen and J. Leneutre, “A Game Theoretical Framework of Intrusion Detection In Heterogenous Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (TIFS), 2009.
  
• H. Otrok, N. Mohammed, L. Wang, M. Debbabi and P. Bhattacharya, “A Game-Theoretic Intrusion Detection Model for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,” Computer Communications journal, Volume 31, Issue 4, March 2008.
• M. Mehrandish, C. Assi and M. Debbabi, “A Game Theoretic Model to Handle Network Intrusions over Multiple Packets,” In Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), Turkey, June 2006.
• Y. Liu, C. Comaniciu, H. Man, “Modeling Misbehavior in Ad Hoc Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach for Intrusion Detection,” International Journal of Security and Networks (IJSN), 2006.
• A. Patcha and J.-M. Park, “A game theoretic formulation for intrusion detection in mobile ad hoc networks,” International Journal of Network Security, Vol. 2, No. 2, Mar. 2006, pp. 146-152.
• T. Alpcan and T. Basar, “A Game Theoretic Analysis of Intrusion Detection in Access Control Systems,” In Proc. of 43rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Dec 2004.
• T. Alpcan and T. Basar, “A Game Theoretic Approach to Decision and Analysis in Network Intrusion Detection,” In Proc. of 42nd IEEE CDC, Dec 2003.
• M. Kodialam and T. Lakshman, “Detecting Network Intrusions via Sampling: A Game Theoretic Approach,” Bell Laboratories Lucent Technologies, April 2003.

 

Sensor Networks Security

This work addresses how game theory can be used to design security mechanisms for the prevention of DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks.

• A. Agah, K. Basu, S. K. Das, “Security enforcement in wireless sensor networks: A framework based on non-cooperative games,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing Journal on Security in Wireless Mobile computing systems (PMC) , Elsevier, Vol.2, pp.137-158, January 2006.

 

Security Mechanisms

• K. C. Nguyen, T. Alpcan, and T. Basar, “Security games with incomplete information,” in Proc. of IEEE Intl. Conf. on Communications (ICC 2009), Dresden, Germany, June 2009.
• A. Miura-Ko, B. Yolken, N. Bambos, and J. Mitchell, "Security Investment Games of Interdependent Organizations,” Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton, IL, September 2008.
  

 

Game Theory and Cryptography

Recently, cryptographers started applying game theory to multi-party computation. For example, they have proved the existence of k-resilient Nash equilibrium in the secret sharing protocols. Moreover, by using a game-theoretic framework, they analyze the robustness of trust inference protocols in the presence of adversarial nodes.

• S. Micali and A. Shelat, “Purely Rational Secret Sharing,” Theory of Cryptography Conference, San Francisco, March 2009
• S. Izmalkov, M. Lepinski, and S. Micali, “Verifiably Secure Devices (and Correlated Equilibrium),” Theory of Cryptography Conference, New York, February 2008
  
• J. Katz, “Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions,” 5th Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC) 2008.
• G. Kol and M. Naor, “Cryptography and game theory: Designing protocols for exchanging information,” In 5th Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC), 2008.
• Y. Dodis and T. Rabin, “Cryptography and game theory,” In Algorithmic Game Theory, Nisan et al., Cambridge University Press, 2007.
• I. Abraham, D. Dolev, R. Gonen, and J. Halpern, “Distributed computing meets game theory: Robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation,” In Proc. 25th ACM PODC, 2006.
• S. Izmalkov, M. Lepinski and S. Micali, “Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design”, Foundation of Computer Science Conference, Pittsburgh, October 2005.
  
• R. Morselli and B. Bhattacharjee, “A Game-Theoretic Framework for Analyzing Trust-Inference Protocols,” Second Workshop on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2004.
• Y. Dodis, S. Halevi, T. Rubin, “A cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem,” Crypto 2000
  
  

Distributed Systems

• A.S. Ayer, L. Alvisi, A. Clement, M. Dahlin, J.-P. Martin, and C. Porth, “BAR Fault Tolerance for Cooperative Services," In  the 20th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP) 2005.